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Faculty and Deans

THE COUNTERMAJORITARIAN PARADOX
Neal Devins*
LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY:

THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND THE

MAKING OFROE V. WADE.By David J. Garrow. New York: Mac-

millan PublishingCo. 1994. Pp. 981. $28.

In 1970, judicial recognition of abortion rights seemed farfetched. In Januaryof that year, Linda Greenhouse wrote in the
New York TimesMagazineabout a "rightto abortion"- describing "[s]ucha notion ... [as] fantastic,illusory. The Constitutionis
searchedin vain for any mention of it. The very phraserings of the
rhetoric of a Women's Liberationmeeting."' While Greenhouse's
bit of hyperbole was a setup to one of the first full-blownpopular
press treatments of burgeoning judicial recognition of abortion
rights, no one could have foreseen the prospect of a sweeping
Supreme Court decision invalidating forty-six state antiabortion

laws -

at least not in 1970.

At that time, however, the events leading up to the Supreme
Court's Roe v. Wade2decision had already been set in motion. In

the fall of 1969, Norma McCorvey -

a.k.a. Jane Roe -

realized

she was pregnant and sought legal counsel to attack Texas's antiabortion statute. In June 1970, a three-judge federal district court

struck down Texas'santiabortionstatute on privacygrounds.3 Just
one year later, the Supreme Court granted certiorariin Roe and

McCorvey's attorneys -

Linda Coffee and Sarah Weddington

were furiouslyworkingon their Courtbriefs. In January1973, after
two oral argumentsand the additionsof JusticesLewis Powell and
William Rehnquist to the Court, the Supreme Court's opinion in
Roe sent shock waves throughoutthe nation.
How could a decision of such monumentalimport catch the nation -

including most legal academics -

by surprise?4 Was Roe,

as Robert Bork suggests, a brazen "judicialusurpationof demo* Professorof Law, Lecturerin Government,College of William& Mary. A.B. 1978,
Georgetown;J.D. 1982,Vanderbilt.- Ed. Thanksto KathyAbramsand MaryDudziakfor
useful commentary.
1. Linda J. Greenhouse,ConstitutionalQuestion: Is Therea Right to Abortion?,N.Y.
Jan.25, 1970, ? 6 (Magazine),at 30.
TIMES,
2. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
3. Roe v. Wade,314 F. Supp. 1217 (N.D. Tex. 1970).
4. See DAVID W. ROHDE& HAROLDJ. SPAETH,SUPREMECOURTDECISIONMAKING

151, 170 n.33 (1976).
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cratic prerogatives"?5Alternatively, was Roe the inevitable outa decision whose
growth of Griswold v. Connecticut6 precedentialeffect was not realized because it struckdown "an uncommonly silly law,"7Connecticut'santiquatedban on the use of
contraceptives?
David J. Garrow'sLibertyand Sexuality: The Right to Privacy
and the Making of Roe v. Wade8 helps answer these and many
other questions. Garrowmeticulouslyuncovers the events leading
up to Griswoldand Roe and the deliberationsof the Justices and
their clerks in both cases. While the book - at close to 1000 pages
- is weighed down by its own thoroughness,Garrowlays bare the
efforts of reproductivefreedom advocates and the Justicessympathetic to their arguments.
Despite covering territory that Bernard Schwartz, Mary
Dudziak, and others have alreadyexplored,9Libertyand Sexuality
is a strikingly original work. Garrow painstakingly details the
inner-workingsof both the reproductivefreedom community and
the SupremeCourtin Griswoldand Roe. By interviewingwell over
two hundred individualswho participatedin these controversies
and readingeverythingand anythingconnectedto these disputesincludingthe case files of formerJusticesWilliamBrennan,William
0. Douglas, and ThurgoodMarshall- Garrowhas provided the
definitiveaccount of the plaintiffs'side of Griswoldand Roe. This
account, in and of itself, is an extraordinaryachievement.
Libertyand Sexualityseeks to be much more than a history of
the Griswoldand Roe litigation,however. Perceivingthe constitutional right to privacyto be a "basictruth"(p. 705) and Roe to be
"the legal and moral equivalentof Brown v. Board of Education,"'0
Liberty and Sexuality seeks to give Roe v. Wade its due as "a
landmarkin the growth of Americanfreedom.""1Garrowpursues
his normativeends throughtwo techniques. First, Garrowfocuses
his attention on the reproductivefreedom community. By treating
OF AMERICA116 (1990).
5. ROBERTH. BORK,THE TEMPTING
6. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
7. 381 U.S. at 527 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
8. David Garrow is a legal historian whose Bearing the Cross won the Pulitzer Prize in
1987.
THE UNPUBLISHED
OPINIONSOFTHEBURGERCOURT839. See BERNARDSCHWARTZ,
THE UNPUBBURGERCOURT];BERNARDSCHWARTZ,
151 (1988) [hereinafter SCHWARTZ,
WARREN
LISHEDOPINIONSOFTHEWARRENCOURT227-39 (1985) [hereinafter SCHWARTZ,
COURT];Mary L. Dudziak, Just Say No: Birth Control in the Connecticut Supreme Court
Before Griswold v. Connecticut, 75 IOWAL. REV. 915 (1990); Catherine G. Roraback, Griswold v. Connecticut: A Brief Case History, 16 OHION.U. L. REV. 395 (1989).
10. Michael Anderson, From Civil Rights to Abortion Rights, N.Y. TIMES,Feb. 20, 1994,
? 7 (Book Review), at 7 (quoting an interview with David Garrow).
11. A Conversation with David J. Garrow, News from Macmillan (copy on file with
author).
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the story of these social activistsand lawyers as the one worth telling, Garrow - through an evenhanded but generally sympathetic
portrayalof these individuals- places his readers in the shoes of
one side of the bitter struggle over abortion. The prolife community, to the extent Garrowconsidersit, is typicallyportrayedin less

sympathetic terms.12 For Garrow, who - in promoting Liberty and
Sexuality - has described Operation Rescue as "really beyond the

pale in just the same way the Klan is,"'3 the prolife communityis
principallyviewed as an obstacle on the path toward the achievement of liberty.
Garrow's second technique is purely factual. Specifically, by
demonstratingthat Catholicinterestsin Connecticuteffectively and
repeatedly blocked efforts to repeal that state's anticontraceptive
law and that a burgeoningright-to-lifemovement may well have
underminedprochoice legislative reform efforts, Libertyand Sexuality implies that court action was instrumentalto the cause of reproductivefreedom.14 In striking this significantblow for judicial
activism, Garrow masterfully rebuffs two strands of historically
based criticismof Griswoldand Roe. First, Garrowlays to rest the
claim that Yale law professors cooked up Griswold because, as
JudgeBork put it at his confirmationhearing,"theylike this kind of
litigation."'5 Instead, he demonstratesthat before Griswoldstruck
it down, Connecticut'santicontraceptionlaw had blocked creation
of family planning centers for low-income women for more than
two decades, thereby providingan equity-basedjustificationfor the
lawsuit. Second, contrary to the recent wave of attacks by
prochoice liberals - including Clinton Supreme Court appointee
12. Garrowlimitshis descriptionof JohnNoonan - then a Universityof Californialaw
professorand now a federalappealscourtjudge - to three words: "RomanCatholiclawyer." P. 330. Noonan,however,faresmuchbetter than ReaganAssociate Deputy Attorney
General Bruce Fein - whom Garrowrefers to as "[a]nundistinguishedbut often-quoted
one-time Justice Departmentofficial"(p. 267) - and Fordhamlaw professorRobert M.
Byrn,who Garrowdescribesas "a forty-year-oldbachelorwho still lived withhis mother"(p.
522).
13. David J. Garrow,David Garrowon Roe v. Wade,RTS.,Apr.-June1994,at 2,4 (interview with Edith Tiger).
14. This lesson is implicitin Libertyand Sexuality. Garrow'stechniqueis to sweep his
readersaway in a tidal wave of informationand, after they have recoveredfrom this factual
onslaught,to let them reachwhateverconclusionsthey may. For many reviewersof Liberty
and Sexuality,Garrow'srefusalto explainwhatlessonsshouldbe drawnfromhis narrativeis
a frustratingshortcoming.See, e.g., GeraldRosenberg,PoliticalProcessesand Institutions,23
CONTEMP.
SOCY.656 (1994);R. Alta Charo, The CivilRightsStruggleOverHumanReproduction,26 FAM.PLAN.PERSP.181 (1994) (book review);KristinLuker, The Hard Road to
at
Roe, N.Y. TIMES,Feb. 20, 1994, ? 7 (Book Review) (reviewing LIBERTYANDSEXUALITY),

7. For me, I ratherliked being left to my own devices to make sense of the extraordinary
mass of uniformlywell-presentedinformationthat is Libertyand Sexuality.
15. Nominationof RobertH. Bork To Be AssociateJusticeof the SupremeCourtof the
UnitedStates:HearingsBeforethe SenateComm.on theJudiciary,100thCong., 1st Sess., pt.
1, at 116 (1987) (statementof Robert H. Bork).
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Ruth Bader Ginsburg- againstRoe as being counterproductiveto
the prochoicemovement, Garrow'shistory lesson makes clear that
the prochoice movement was necessarilydependent upon judicial
action.
Garrow'shistory lesson is incomplete,however. While demonstratingthat Roe was a necessarystep to the creation of meaningful
abortion rights, Liberty and Sexualityinaccuratelyinfers that the
story of reproductivefreedom is one of judicialresistanceto legislatures dominatedby prolife interest groups. Garrow does not consider the ways in which judicial decisionmaking and elected
governmentaction affected each other. For example,althoughLibertyand Sexualityconsiderspost-Roe developmentsup throughthe
Supreme Court's 1992 reaffirmationof abortion rights in Planned
Parenthoodv. Casey,16it limits its sights to court-relatedaction.
Garrow does not give any meaningfultreatmentto legislation and
regulationdesignedto alter the face of abortionrights. More significantly, he does not considerthe ramificationsof such elected government action on Court decisionmaking. Garrow simply cannot
achieve his granderobjectiveof helping "peopleto appreciatewhat
Roe really represents"17without consideringthe constitutionaldialogue that has taken place between the courts and elected government in the three decades since Griswoldand the two decades since
Roe.
That Garrow'spresentationis incomplete reveals Liberty and
Sexuality'sobsession with elevatingthe stature of Roe v. Wadeto a
victory for American freedom on the order of Brown v. Board of
Education. At one level, Garrow'scomparisonfails because Brown
is generallyunderstoodto be "the greatestmoral triumphconstitutional law ha[s] ever produced,"18whereas honorable people can
disagree about the moral rightnessof a decision that places reproductive autonomy ahead of potential human life. Yet, even if the
Roe-Brownanalogy is appropriate- as it almost certainlyis for a
good many of Garrow'sreaders- Brownitself points to the necessity of getting beyond Supreme Court decisions and into elected
governmentaction in explicatingthe shaping of constitutionalvalues. Just as the story of Brown must include southern resistance,
the 1964 Civil Rights Act,19and the busingcontroversy,the story of
Roe v. Wade encompasses abortion funding restrictions,the "gag
rule," and several other legislative and executive initiatives.
16. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
17. A Conversationwith David J. Garrow,supranote 11.
18. BORK,supra note 5, at 77.

19. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended principallyat 42 U.S.C.
?? 2000a to 2000h-6(1988 & Supp. III 1991)).
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This review will help put Roe in properperspectiveby considering the ways that elected governmentand judicial action influence
each other. In particular,the story of abortionrightsmust consider
how social and political forces contributedto the Court'smoderation of Roe in Planned Parenthoodv. Casey, a decision that replaced Roe's stringent trimester standard with a less demanding
"undue burden" test.20 While this exercise may deflate Roe's
achievements, it will also point to the pivotal role that Supreme
Court decisions play in elected governmentdeliberations. Specifically, when consideringthe constitutionalityof legislativeand regulatory initiatives,elected governmenthas looked to SupremeCourt
decisions as the definingbenchmark. Furthermore,ratherthan approvinglegislation or regulationsdirectlyat odds with Roe, elected
governmenthas expressedits opposition throughfundingbans and
other indirect techniques. Finally, and most significantly,Roe and
its progeny shaped elected government attitudes toward abortion.
The result of this interactionis that despite the Casey Court's returningmuch of the abortionissue to the states, state lawmakers
apparentlypreferringthe Roe-createdstatus quo - no longer appear interested in enacting antiabortionrestrictions.
Liberty and Sexuality recognizes neither the profound role
played by political and social influences in Court decisionmaking
nor the equally profoundeffect of Courtdecisionmakingin shaping
the scope and sweep of elected governmentaction. Garrow'sbook
is nonetheless monumental- far and away the definitive guide to
the Court's reasoning in and the political developments that preceded Griswoldand Roe. This review, buildingupon Garrow'slessons regardingthe Supreme Court's role in the abortion dispute,
offers an alternativeparadigmto the one Garrowsuggests. Part I
of this review summarizesLibertyand Sexuality'sample teachings
about the leadershiprole that courtsplayed in fueling the reproductive autonomy movement. Without decisions like Griswold and
Roe, as Libertyand Sexualitymakes clear, it is uncertainwhether
and when the political process would have recognized an individual's right to reproductivefreedom. Part II of this review extends
the teachings of Liberty and Sexuality by considering the ways
elected governmentand the courts influence each other.
I.

THE ROAD TO ROE

Libertyand Sexualityis at its best when demonstratingthe necessity of judicialaction to make reproductivefreedom meaningful,
particularlyby using the stories of those involved in this crusade.
Contraryto what we are led to believe by the self-servingrevision20. 112 S. Ct. at 2819.
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ist histories of conservativeswho dislike judicially created rights
and progressives who now see the legislatures as more rightsprotective than the courts, the evisceration of Connecticut's anticontraceptionstatute and the establishmentof meaningful abortion rights requiredjudicialintervention.
A.

Birth Control in Connecticut

Garrow'spresentationof the story of Griswoldis truly a revelation, for the Bork view that Griswoldwas simply a test case put
together by a groupof elites at the Yale law school is widely shared.
Indeed, duringmy firstyear of teaching,I was told a tale about how
the wife of Yale University's president - who, along with her
upper-crustfriends,was active in PlannedParenthood- convinced
New Haven's chief of police at a cocktail party to arrest her for
violatingthe otherwiseunenforcedanticontraceptionstatute.21The
truth of the matter is that the Connecticutlaw blocked the operation of family planning clinics, preventing poor women from,
among other things, being able to be fitted for diaphragms.22Roman Catholichospitalsin several Connecticutcities, moreover, dismissed from their staffs doctors who publicly opposed the
anticontraceptionstatute.23While men were able to purchasecondoms at gas stations, drug stores, and the like (p. 128), and women
of means were able to skirt the Connecticut law through statecondoned diaphragmfittingsat the offices of noncomplyingphysicians (p. 136), the effect of the anticontraceptionstatute was hardly
imaginary.
The real story of Griswoldbegins in 1939. In June of that year,
the Catholic Clergy Association of Waterburypassed a resolution,
"readfrom the pulpit of each and every Roman CatholicChurchin
Waterbury,"condemningbirth control as "contraryto the natural
law and thereforeimmoral"and callingfor the enforcement"to the
full extent of the law" of an 1879 Connecticutcriminalstatute sanctioning individualswho use or assist in the use of contraceptives(p.
5). Drafted by P.T. Barnum -

"of circus fame" (p. 16) -

and

supportedby Catholicchurchofficialswho arguedthat "[t]he Creator gave the sex functionfor just one purpose"(p. 17), the Connecticut law was generally ignored and seemed destined to become
obsolete when the Waterburyclergy made their appeal. In response to the clergy'scall to shut down the recently opened Waterbury MaternalHealth Center,however,police raidedthe clinic and
arrested its physician-directors.Following a state supreme court
21. Garrowlists severalversionsof this story. See pp. 267-68.
22. P. 171. Manyof these womentraveledto New York state for diaphragmfittings. P.
139.
23. See Dudziak,supranote 9, at 928-29.
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decision upholdingthe statute,24the Waterburyclinic and all other
birth control clinics in Connecticutclosed their doors (pp. 77-78).
For the next twenty-five years, family planning advocates in
Connecticut - led by Kit Hepburn, the actress's mother and an
activistwhose reformefforts date back to 1910 (pp. 9-10) - unsuccessfullylobbied the Connecticutlegislatureto repeal the 1879 statute. Despite a pronounced"gapbetween the practicesof Catholic
lay people and the proclamations of church officials,"25the
Catholic-dominatedConnecticutSenate repeatedlystymied legislative reformin Connecticut. Testifyingbefore the Connecticutlegislature about "'moral principles which are the foundation of this
law'" (p. 127) and using its pulpits to inform parishioners that
"'support of any candidate advocatingbirth control measures is a
violation of the naturallaw of God' " (p. 118), the CatholicChurch
was a special interestfar more powerfulthan the combinedforce of
family planningadvocates and public opinion.
Withno meaningfulprospectfor legislativereform,birthcontrol
advocates turned their attention to the courts. In Tilestonv. Ullman26and Poe v. Ullman,27however, Connecticutstate courts and
the U.S. Supreme Court proved unsympatheticto these efforts.
The Supreme Court's attitude - brilliantlyand thoroughly canvassed in Liberty and Sexuality -

was akin to the view later ex-

pressed by Judge Bork, namely, that the Connecticut statute was
unenforced and therefore a nullity. It did not matter to the Court
that the anticontraceptionstatute was challengedby doctors unable
to treat their patients as well as marriedcouples who faced significant pregnancy-relatedthreatsto their physicalhealth (pp. 144-46).
For Chief JusticeEarl Warren,the plaintiffs- seeking to force the
Court to embrace the then-discrediteddoctrine of substantivedue
process - had made the Justices" 'guineapigs for an abstractprinciple'" (p. 181). To prove this point, Justice Felix Frankfurter
called WaterburyprosecutorBill Fitzgeraldto discuss his affidavit
that any person who violates the 1879 statute "'must expect to be
prosecuted and punished'" (p. 187). This remarkableconversation
confirmed Frankfurter'sintuition that there was little threat of
prosecution under the Connecticutstatute.
Although the SupremeCourthad declaredthe Connecticutlaw
a practical nullity, Planned Parenthood - both fearing prosecutions and hoping to change the law throughjudicial or legislative
reform - had yet to violate the 1879 statute. Consequently,with
24. State v. Nelson, 11 A.2d 856 (Conn. 1940).
25. P. 164. When Griswoldwas argued,seventy-eightpercentof Catholicsthoughtthat
birth controlinformationshouldbe widelyavailable. P. 229.
26. 26 A.2d 582 (Conn. 1942).
27. 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
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no birth control clinics in Connecticut, Poe forced Planned
Parenthoodto choose between open defianceof the law by providing contraceptiveservices and legislativereform efforts, which had
proven unsuccessfulfor close to fifty years. The former course was
chosen. One day afterPoe, PlannedParenthoodopenly declaredits
intention to violate the law by publiclyoffering contraceptiveservices, noting in a press statement that they "would 'of course welcome prosecutionby the state' so that the 'absurdand antiquated'
1879 law could be removed from the books" (p. 196). Within one
week of the clinic'sopening,police arrestedEstelle Griswold,president of Connecticut's Planned Parenthood Federation, and Lee
Buxton, the former chair of the obstetrics and gynecology department at Yale's medical school, presentingthe Court with a clearly
justiciable challenge to the 1879 statute.28
The Supreme Court found itself in a quandarywith Griswold.
Earl Warren'sdecision to assignthe case to WilliamO. Douglas
whose cavalier approachto opinion writing revealed an "inattention to legal detail and indifferenceto precedent"29- did not help
matters. His initial Griswold draft, as Garrow points out, "may
have taken more than twentyminutes [to write],but not [by] much"
(p. 245). Unwilling to utilize the substantivedue process analysis
that he and other New Dealers fought so hard to defeat, Douglas
relied on the First Amendment'sright of association,an approach
that prompted Justice Hugo Black to state at conference that the
"'right of husband and wife to assemble in bed is a new right of
assembly to me'" (p. 245). Recognizing the failings of Douglas's
initial approach,WilliamBrennanand his law clerk Paul Posner devised an alternative strategy. "'Instead of expanding the First
Amendment,'" Brennanwrote Douglas, why not say the Connecticut statute violates the right to privacy" 'createdout of the Fourth
Amendment and the Fifth, together with the Third'" (p. 247).
Fromthis letter emergedDouglas's recognitionof a rightto privacy
"emanating"from the "penumbras"surroundingvariousprovisions
of the Bill of Rights.30
28. Specifically,in response to pressurefrom James G. Morris,"a forty-two-year-old
WestHavenRomanCatholicfatherof five [who]wasthe nightmanagerof Avis Rent-a-Car's
DowntownGarage,"(p. 202) New Haven police investigateda just-openedfamilyplanning
clinic. There they found Estelle Griswoldwho "was quite overjoyed to see them" and
promptlytold police of action she had taken in "violationof the [1879]law." P. 203.
WARREN
29. SCHWARTZ,
COURT,supra note 9, at 237 (quoting JAMESF. SIMON,INJOURNEY:THE LIFEOF WILLIAMO. DOUGLAS252-53 (1980)).
DEPENDENT

alternativealso seemed silly, "attract[ing]the giggles"of the
30. This Brennan-inspired
Justices'clerks. P. 249. SeveralJusticesconsideredalternativeapproaches,none of which
attractedsignificantsupport. ArthurGoldbergsettled on a Ninth Amendmentstrategyand
instructedhis law clerk - now SupremeCourtJustice- StephenBreyer"to undertakethe
appropriateresearchand preliminarydrafting."P. 250. Another approach- suggestedby
Warrenlaw clerk and Roe criticJohn Hart Ely - was to invalidatethe 1879 law on equal
protectiongroundsby looking at "howthe Connecticutstatute preventedthe operationof
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That Griswoldmight reinvigoratesubstantivedue process decisionmaking, with the benefit of twenty-twenty hindsight, seems
hardlysurprising.When Griswoldwas decided, however, the Court
was clearly uncomfortablewith taking this step. Libertyand Sexuality makes this abundantlyclear. Warren'sdiscomfort with substantive due process explainshis decision not to assign Griswoldto
John MarshallHarlan(p. 243), who - with the help of his law clerk
and later Reagan Solicitor General CharlesFried31- had earlier
relied on substantivedue process analysisin attackingthe constitutionality of the Connecticutstatute (p. 195). Moreover,while many
of the Justices spoke of the marital right to privacyin their Griswold determinations,these Justices recognized that it would be
quite a trick "to persuasively articulate how one or another accepted constitutionaldoctrine applied to the Connecticut statute"
(pp. 243-44; emphasis added). The Court never accomplishedthis
trick. For better or worse, Griswold began the Court's descent
down the slippery slope that ultimatelyled it to Roe's formal embrace of substantivedue process decisionmaking.
B. From Griswoldto Roe
A New York Universitylaw student, Roy Lucas, discoveredthe
Griswold-Roenexus in the fall of 1966.32That neither the reproductive rights communitynor legal academicssaw Griswoldas the
first step to court-orderedabortion rights now seems remarkable.
At the time of Griswold,however, there was little reason to think
that the Supreme Court was preparedto seize on substantivedue
process doctrine to alter fundamentallythe laws of nearly every
state. Garrow, while sympatheticto the Court's expansive use of
privacy,makes clear that the Griswold-Roeconnection was barely
imaginableuntil fledglinglaw graduateRoy Lucas began convincing federal courts to strikedown antiabortionlaws in the late 1960s.
Before Griswold,the thought of a constitutionalright to abortion seemed farfetched. Birth control pioneer MargaretSanger, in
explaining her opposition to Connecticut'santicontraceptionlaw,
" 'emphasizedstronglythat the advocatesof birthcontrol are not in
favor of abortion,but desire only to prevent the beginningof life' "
(p. 17). The originallegal challenge to the Connecticutlaw, moreover, labeled "contraceptionthe 'antithesis'of abortion ... [which]
birth control clinics for the poor, but not the provisionof similarservicesto better-offpatients of privatephysicians."P. 237. Whileprochoicecriticsof Roe now embracethis tactic,
none of the Griswold-eraJusticespursuedthis approach. P. 250.
31. FriedinformedHarlanbefore oral argumentsin the Poe case that "'individualmarried couples have a right to engage in maritalrelationsin the privacyof their own consciences.'" P. 174.
32. Roy Lucas,FederalConstitutional
Limitationson the Enforcementand Administration
of StateAbortionStatutes,46 N.C. L. REV.730 (1968).
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'the State has the right to control.'"33. With few exceptions preGriswold abortion rights advocates opposed efforts to repeal antiabortionmeasuresin favor of less-sweepingreforms. In 1959, for
example,Alan Guttmacherspoke of " 'vigorouslyoppos[ing]'"any
proposal for "'unrestrictedlegal abortion'" (p. 278).
Griswold and its immediate aftermathlikewise reveal a sharp
divide between the contraceptionand abortion issues. When the
Court heard Griswold,Planned Parenthoodattorney and Yale law
professorThomasEmersonnoted at oral argumentsthat the invalidation of the anticontraceptionlaw would not create a right to
abortion. Emerson claimed that "'[t]he conduct that is being prohibited in the abortion cases'" does not "'occur in the privacyof
the home" and that " '[abortion]involves takingwhat has begun to
be a life.'"34 In the Court's private deliberations of Griswold,
moreover, Earl Warrenwent out of his way to distinguishthe Connecticut statute from antiabortion measures, "implying that he
thought such laws were valid."35More striking than the Court's
considerationof Griswold,as Libertyand Sexualityreveals, is the
first wave of reactions to the case. Roy Lucas's initial choice for
faculty sponsor, Norman Dorsen - who later served as president
of the American Civil Liberties Union - was not enthusiastic
about the project. As Lucaslater recalled," 'People thought it was
a weird idea. My professorskind of laughed at me' " (p. 337). The
civil libertiescommunitytoo thoughtthat Griswolddid not provide
an adequatebasis to challengeabortionlaws. In February1966, the
ACLU concluded that " 'restrictive abortion laws . .. while unduly

restrictive,are not so unreasonableas to be unconstitutional'" and
that " 'society could decide ... to place such value on the life of the
unborn child as to render abortionpossible only in a narrowrange
of circumstances'"(p. 313).
How then did an idea firstconcoctedin the springof 1967 when
Roy Lucas finished his law school paper make its way to the
SupremeCourtfour yearslater when certiorariwas grantedin Roe?
Libertyand Sexualitydoes a superbjob of chroniclingthe meteoric
rise of court-orderedabortion rights, beginning with a July 1968
model brief prepared by Lucas and culminatingwith the Court's
decision in Roe.
For starters, the principal impetus for court-ordered reform
came from the courts themselves. In 1968, retired Supreme Court
JusticeTom C. Clarkadvanceda Griswold-basedright to abortion,
33. P. 70; see also p. 274.
34. P. 240. Emerson,however,did suggestin a 1965 MichiganLaw Reviewsymposium
on Griswoldthat the Courtmightbe willingto recognizeabortionrights. ThomasI. Emerson, Nine Justicesin Searchof a Doctrine,64 MICH.L. REV.219 (1965).
WARREN
35. SCHWARTZ,
COURT,
supranote 9, at 239.
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at least "untilthe time that life is present."36Yet in early 1969 the
principalfocus of the reform movement was legislative liberalization in New York and other states (p. 367). Although Roy Lucas
seemed determinedto launcha series of coordinatedtest case challenges (p. 381), judicial reform did not take hold until the fall of
1969,when courtsin Californiaand Washington,D.C. rejected state
efforts to prosecute doctors for violating antiabortionrestrictions.
In one case, People v. Belous,37the CaliforniaSupreme Court declared that "[t]he fundamental right of the woman to choose
whether to bear childrenfollows from the SupremeCourt'sand this
court's repeated acknowledgementof a 'right to privacy.'"38 In
federal districtcourtjudge GerhardGesell
UnitedStatesv. Vuitch,39
in Supreme Court decisions that
of
indication"
spoke
"increasing
the "right of privacy ...

may well include the right to remove an

unwanted child at least in early stages of pregnancy."40
With Belous and Vuitch, the prochoice community began to
grasp the obvious, namely, that courts were far more likely than
legislators to liberalize abortion rights. The most visible of these
challenges, of course, is Roe itself. Garrow makes clear that the
Roe litigation, unlike the NAACP's deliberative strategy in

Brown,41 was decidedly haphazard -

much closer to spontaneous

combustion than to the carefullydrawnplans of some national interest group.
The chain reaction that ultimatelyproducedRoe v. Wadebegan
in March 1969, when women membersof the University of Texas's
Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) turned to gender issues
after witnessing"the disagreeablysexist behaviorof SDS's male national leaders"at an SDS National Council meeting (p. 389). One
manifestation of this shift was the distributionof information on
how to obtain an abortionin Mexico. Perceivingthat more needed
to be done, these women asked SarahWeddington- a 1967 Texas
law graduate - whether she would consider launchinga constitutional challenge to Texas's antiabortionlaw (p. 395). Weddington
agreed, enlisted the help of her law school classmateLinda Coffee,
and waited for a plaintiff to materialize. Thanks to serendipity,a
pregnant woman who wanted an abortion, Norma McCorvey,
36. P. 372 (quoting Tom C. Clark,Religion,Morality,and Abortion: A Constitutional
Appraisal,2 Loy. L.A.L. REV.1, 8-9 (1969)).
37. 458 P.2d 194 (Cal. 1969).
38. Belous, 458 P.2d at 199 (quotedat p. 377).
39. 305 F. Supp. 1032 (D.D.C. 1969),revd.,402 U.S. 62 (1971).
40. Vuitch,305 F. Supp. at 1035,quotedat p. 382.
41. On the NAACP's litigation strategy, see JACK GREENBERG,CRUSADERS IN THE
COURTS(1994) (reviewed in this issue by Professor Margaret Russell - Ed.); RICHARD
KLUGER,SIMPLEJUSTICE(1975); MARK V. TUSHNET,THE NAACP's LEGALSTRATEGY
AGAINSTSEGREGATED
EDUCATION,1925-1950 (1987).
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quickly emerged and grantedher permissionto launch a Jane Roe
challenge to the Texas law.42
While the rest may be history,Libertyand Sexualitydoes a phenomenaljob of exposinghow many rocks there were on the road to
Roe. Farfrom a pitched battle between high-poweredveteran lawyers, the contest between Weddingtonand Coffee, and the State of
Texas reveals the grass-rootsnature of the Roe challenge. Weddington and Coffee did their own typingin filingtheir originalcomplaint and brief (pp. 438-39). In preparingtheir Supreme Court
filings,Weddingtonin particularconfronteda lack of resources,necessitating her lawyer-husband'slast minute participationin the
brief drafting,and the help of an overly aggressiveRoy Lucas,who
-

as head of the poorly run Madison Institute -

sought to dis-

place her as lead counsel in the case.43 For the State of Texas, Roe
inspired a less-than-vigorousdefense. The bulk of the Texas brief
was lifted directlyfrom a prolife amicusfiling by two hundredand
twenty-twophysicians- a brief that had been sharedwith the state
for this very purpose.44
InternalSupremeCourtdeliberationslikewise reveal that when
Roe was first argued,its landmarkstatus was anythingbut inevitable. The originalBlackmundraft,as revealed by BernardSchwartz
in 1988, struck down the Texas statute on vagueness grounds and
expressly rejected the argumentthat "'a pregnant woman has an
unlimited right to do with her body as she pleases.'"45 How this
weak-kneedapproachto abortionrightsevolved into Roe's express
embraceof substantivedue processand its unyieldingtrimestertest
is one of the highlights of Liberty and Sexuality. For starters,
42. Norma McCorvey- unlike the challengersto the Connecticutanticontraception
statute- wasindigent,uneducated,andnot particularlyinterestedin reshapingthe direction
of constitutionaljurisprudence.P. 404. In convincingMcCorvey,Coffee "stressedthat being
a plaintiffwouldnot take muchtime, wouldnot entailany costs, and almostcertainlywould
not requireany courtroomtestimonyor public identification."Id. Trueto Coffee's word,
McCorveywas out of the loop throughoutthe Roe litigation.
43. Pp. 461-62. Lucas'saggressivetacticswerenot appreciated.SarahWeddingtoneventually cut off communicationwith Lucas. P. 564. Prochoicelawyersalso shut Lucasout of
Doe v. Bolton,410 U.S. 179 (1973),Roe's companioncase. P. 463. In the end, while Lucas
playedan instrumentalrole in framingthe prochoicelitigationstrategy,his self-righteousand
intrusiveposturingalienatedhim frommuchof the reproductiveautonomycommunity.See
pp. 463-64, 469-70,493, 505.
44. Pp. 510-11. Texasdid not help its positionat oral argument.JayFloyd, who argued
the case on behalfof Texas,beganhis argumentwithan off-colorremark.Referringto Sarah
Weddingtonand LindaCoffee, Floydcommented:"It'san old joke, but when a man argues
againsttwo beautifulladies like this, they are going to have the last word." Oral Argument
BRIEFSAND ARGUTranscript, 410 U.S. 113 (1993) (No. 70-18), reprinted in 75 LANDMARK
MENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONALLAW 796 (Philip

B. Kurland& GerhardCaspereds., 1975). Floydfurtherweakenedhis case by respondingto
a questionaboutTexas'schoiceto specifythat life beginsat conceptionby waxingphilosophically that "thereare unanswerablequestionsin this field"and "[w]hendoes the soul come
into the unborn- if a person believes in a soul - I don't know." 75 Id. at 804.
BURGERCOURT,supra note 9, at 90.
45. SCHWARTZ,
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WarrenBurger'sdecision to assignRoe, and its companionGeorgia
case, Doe v. Bolton46,to HarryBlackmun- accordingto William
Douglas at least - reeks of the Chief Justice'smanipulationof his
case assignment authority. Although Blackmun was willing to
strike down the Texas statute, Douglas's conference notes suggest
that both Burger and Blackmunapproved of Georgia's draconian
restrictionson abortionrights (p. 533). Matterswere further complicated when Blackmun signed onto a Burger-led effort to have
Roe and Doe reargued so that newly confirmedNixon appointees
Lewis Powell and WilliamRehnquistcould participatein the decision. According to Blackmun,"I believe, on an issue so sensitive
and so emotional as this one, the countrydeserves the conclusionof
a nine-man,not a seven-mancourt" (p. 552; emphasis added).
Contrary to Burger's apparent intent, reargument, thanks to
Lewis Powell's firmingup the prochoice coalition, moved the Roe
draft towardsan absolutistprochoiceposture.47Not only did Powell support overturningthe Texas and Georgia statutes, but "he
thought Roe 'should [be] the lead case' and that he would decide it
not on vagueness grounds but on the more basic issue" (p. 575).
Combustingwith a strengthenedmajority,Brennan and Marshall
- in a criticalletter written by Marshall'slaw clerk Mark Tushnet
- successfullylobbied Blackmunfor the establishmentof a trimester standardguaranteeingwomen an unqualifiedright to abortion
duringthe first three months of pregnancy(pp. 583-85). Although
Potter Stewart objected to this "inflexiblylegislative" approach,
Blackmun concluded that such judicial policymaking,while "arbitrary,"was "not to be avoided."48
C. Judicialv. LegislativeReform
The Court designed Roe v. Wadeto put an end to the abortion
dispute. Justice Harry Blackmun put forth a trimester test governingstate authorityover the abortiondecision both to make clear
what the Courtintended and to limit futuregovernmentalefforts to
sidestep the Court'sdecision. Indeed, Blackmunimplored his colleagues to decide Roe " 'no later than the week of January15 to tie
in with the convening of most state legislatures'" (p. 585) and proposed issuinga press statementto accompanythe decision - something that had never been done and ultimatelywas not done here
- to keep the press from " 'going all the way off the deep end' " in
reportingnews of the decision (p. 587).
46. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
47. JOHNC. JEFFRIES,
JR. 332-52 (1994) (reviewed in this
JR., JUSTICELEWISF. POWELL,
issue - Ed.).

48. Bob Woodward,TheAbortionPapers,WASH.POST,Jan.22, 1989,at D1, D2.
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Blackmun'sefforts here reveal that politics played a large role
in both the content and packagingof Roe. When he announcedthe
decision, however, Blackmunstarted his opinion by observingthat
the judicialtask was "to resolve the issue by constitutionalmeasurement, free of emotion and of predilection."49Portrayingthe Court
as being above the political fray, the supreme pursuerof constitutional truth in our three-branch system, Blackmun apparently
sought to strengthen the Court's legitimacy and to ensure that
states widely followed Roe.50 Twentyyears later, in announcinghis
retirement, Blackmun declared victory. With prochoice president
Bill Clinton at his side and Roe's reaffirmationrecently secured,
BlackmundescribedRoe as "a step that had to be taken as we go
down the road to the full emancipationof women."51
Whether Blackmun'sclaims about Roe's achievementsand the
legacy Blackmunleft us throughRoe are more ethereal than real is
the questiondu jour. Over the past severalyears, prochoiceliberals
have increasinglysavaged Roe. Political scientist Gerald Rosenberg, for example, contends that Roe "was far less responsible for
the changes that occurredthan most people think"52and that the
growth of right-to-lifeforces in the wake of the decision suggests
"that one result of litigationto produce significantsocial reform is
to strengthen the opponents of such change."53More strikingly,
Ruth Bader Ginsburg,in December 1992, lambastedRoe for "prolong[ing]divisivenessand deferr[ing]stable settlement of the [abortion] issue" by short-circuiting early 1970s legislative reform
efforts.54On anotheroccasion,GinsburgattackedRoe as "[h]eavyhanded judicial intervention"and said that it "venturedtoo far in
the change that it ordered."55
What gives? With tens of thousands of legislative proposals,
countless executive initiatives,wicked SupremeCourt confirmation
battles, and more acrimonythan any social policy issue since slavery, it seems a little late in the day to wonder whether or not Roe
mattered. Nevertheless, a slew of highly regarded political scientists and constitutional lawyers - most of whom are avidly
49. Roe v. Wade,410 U.S. 113, 116 (1973).
50. Blackmunadvancedsimilarclaims in subsequentabortion decisions. See Planned
Parenthoodv. Casey,112 S. Ct. 2791,2854 (1992) (Blackmun,J., concurringin the judgment
in partconcurringin part,anddissentingin part);Thorburg v. AmericanCollege of Obst. &
Gyn., 476 U.S. 747, 759, 771 (1986).
51. Linda Greenhouse,The Nation: How a Rulingon Abortion Took on a Life of Its
Own, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 10, 1994, ? 4, at 3.
THE HOLLOWHOPE201 (1991).
52. GERALDN. ROSENBERG,

53. Id. at 342.
54. Ruth Bader Ginsburg,Speakingin a JudicialVoice,67 N.Y.U. L. REV.1185, 1208
(1992).
55. Ruth BaderGinsburg,Some Thoughtson Autonomyand Equalityin Relationto Roe
v. Wade,63 N.C. L. REV.375, 381, 385 (1985).
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prochoice - now depict Roe as counterproductive,a "hollow
hope."56For this new wave of Courtcritics,only social movements
and elected branchaction accomplishmeaningfulreform.
Roe's progressivecriticsemphasizethat in the decade preceding
the decision, the abortionpendulumhad begun to swing.57In 1962,
the Model Penal Code was amended to authorize abortions when
the health of the mother was endangered,when the infant might be
born with incapacitatingphysical or mental deformities, or when
the pregnancywas a result of rape or incest. In 1967, the American
Medical Association endorsed the Model Penal Code's limited approval of abortion. In 1971, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws drafted a Uniform Abortion Act
that would have placed no limitationson abortion during the first
twenty weeks of pregnancy. By the time of Roe, seventeen states
had liberalizedtheir abortionlaws, principallyadoptingthe limited
reformsof the Model Penal Code. Pointingto these developments,
Ginsburgand others maintain that the Court could have left it to
state legislaturesto reform their abortion laws.58
Liberty and Sexuality meets these progressive critics of Roe

head on by demonstratingthat despite changes in state law, the
medical profession,and public opinion, the reformerswere fighting
an uphill battle. Many states rejected the Model Penal Code reform, and some states that enacted reform legislation imposed so
many restrictionsthat the number of legal abortions actually decreased.59When the Courtdecided Roe, strictantiabortionlaws remained on the books in nearly every state. Contraryto Ginsburg's
claims, the abortion reform movement barely put a dent in state
laws criminalizingabortion. "[C]alculatingthat therapeuticexceptions bills were the most they could possiblyattain,"most prochoice
activistsdid not even seek repeal of criminalabortionstatutes (pp.

359, 374).

The legislative battles leading up to Roe are telling for other
reasons. In the early stages of this reformmovement, there was no
right-to-lifemovement. By the time of Roe, a vigorousright-to-life
movement was preparedto do battle with prochoice reformers. Of
great significance,in 1972,right-to-lifeactivistshelped defeat Michigan and North Dakota referenda that would have repealed those
states' criminal abortion laws (pp. 576-77). In the months before
the Roe decision, moreover, prolife interests scored key legislative
56. See ROSENBERG,
supra note 52.
57. See Louis FISHER& NEALDEVINS,POLITICAL
DYNAMICS
OF CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW
233-34 (1992).
58. See supra notes 52-55; see also Cass R. Sunstein, Three Civil Rights Fallacies, 79 CAL.
L. REV. 751, 766-67 (1991).
59. EVA R. RUBIN,ABORTION,POLITICS,
AND THECOURTS23 (rev. ed. 1987).
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victories in Pennsylvania,where legislationallowingabortionsonly
when the mother'slife was threatenedwas approvedby a 157-to-34
vote, and in Massachusetts,which approvedby 178-to-46 a bill that
specified conception as the beginning of human life (p. 547). In
New York, prolife forces, headed by the Roman Catholic Church,
were gaining momentumin an effort to repeal that state's permissive abortion legislation (p. 368).
"From the immediate vantage point of 1973," Garrow concludes, no one in the prochoicecommunity- with memoriesof the
right-to-lifemobilizationeffort "so freshly in mind" - expressed
any regret that the Supreme Court "had ruled that a woman's
choice with regardto abortionwas a constitutionallyprotectedright
ratherthan a criminallypunishablepreferencethat could be left to
the annual vagaries of state legislative votes or statewide popular
referenda"(pp. 616-17). While there is no way of telling precisely
what the politicalprocesswould have yielded had the Courtleft the
abortion decision with the states,60Garrow persuasively demonstrates that the prospectsof sweeping legislative reform were dim.
Most states did not reform their laws, and for the most part, those
that did made only minor alterations. Furthermore,a rapidlygrowing and increasinglypowerfulright-to-lifemovement raised doubts
about future reform efforts.
Liberty and Sexuality'sdefense of judicial intervention - at

least for supporters of reproductive rights -

is convincing. The

stories of Roe and Griswoldreveal that legislative majoritieswere
unwilling to expand reproductiverights. Whether one describes
this failure as the triumphof special interestsor as the preservation
of moral norms, progressivedefenders of the political marketplace
are "faroff target."61
II. THE COUNTERMAJORITARIAN
PARADOX

Garrow'sproof that judicialinterventionand "libertyand sexu-

ality" go hand in hand tells only part of the story of what Roe really
represents. Courts cannot go it alone in ordering massive social

change. Elected government action at the state and federal level
plays an integralrole in the shaping of constitutionalvalues. Libertyand Sexuality,for all its virtues,is blinded by its obsession with
Court action. The book brushes aside state and federal responses

60. On this question,JeffreyRosen concludesthat "[t]hepoliticalevidencethat Garrow
collects fails to undermineGinsburg'sbasic insight." JeffreyRosen, PenumbrasFormedby

Emanations, ATLATrICMONTHLY,
Apr. 1994, at 121, 122 (reviewing LIBERTYAND SEXUAL-

rrY). KathleenSullivan,in contrast,concludesthat "Garrowconvincinglydepictsthe legislative success of the [right-to-lifemovement]." Kathleen M. Sullivan,Law's Labors, NEW
REPUBLIC, May 23, 1994, at 42, 44 (reviewing LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY).

61. DavidGarrow,HistoryLessonfor theJudge:WhatClinton'sSupremeCourtNominee

Doesn't Know About Roe, WASH.POST,June 20, 1993, at C3.
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to Roe - unless they concern attempts to shape Court doctrine
through judicial appointments or Supreme Court advocacy. Indeed, Garrow'scomprehensivediscussionsof the politics surrounding Connecticut's contraception ban and the limits of pre-Roe
legislative reform principallyfunction as a foil to demonstratethe
necessity of judicial intervention.
While detailing the stories of the Roe and Griswoldlitigation is
a monumental achievement, Garrow'spresentationis nonetheless
incomplete and, as a result, slightly misleading. This Part supplements Garrow's history lesson by considering post-Roe politics.
Specifically,this Part calls attention to the ways courts and elected
governmentshape constitutionalvalues and each other.
A. Elected GovernmentAttitudesTowardthe Judiciary
Prochoice advocates' antipathyfor elected government is easy
to understand. Before Roe, nearly every state outlawed or placed
significantrestrictionson abortionaccess. WithoutRoe, moreover,
there is little reason to think - as Garrow ably demonstrates
that state reform efforts would have amounted to much. Finally,
the bulk of post-Roe elected governmentactivityappearsdownright
hostile, not just to Roe but to judicial authorityas well.
Elected governmentresistanceto abortionrights,however, does
not mean that the dialogue between the courts and governmental
actors is fundamentallyadversarial- with the Court persistently
beating down elected government'sattacks. Over the past two decades, the courtshave helped shape legislativenorms. Of equal significance,elected governmentreprisals- contraryto most writings
on this topic62- reveal a profound respect for judicial authority
among elected governmentofficials. In these ways, the Court'sinfluence is even more profoundthan Libertyand Sexualitysuggests.
To be sure, most elected governmentaction has sought to limit
abortionrights. At the same time, no federal and virtuallyno state
action has directly challenged Supreme Court decisionmakingauthority. The campaign to have the Supreme Court overrule Roe,
for example, hardly calls judicial authorityinto question. The appointment of judges who disapproveof Roe as well as the filing of
briefs callingfor Roe's overruling,instead,recognizethat the fate of
Roe lies with the judiciary.
More telling than these Court-centeredefforts, legislative and
regulatoryinitiativesreveal a willingnessto work withinparameters
set by the Supreme Court. At the federal level, a Republicancontrolled Senate rejected early 1980sproposalsthat sought to nul62. See, e.g., BARBARAH. CRAIG& DAVID M. O'BRIEN, ABORTIONAND AMERICAN
POLITICS(1993); RUBIN,supra note 59; LAURENCEH. TRIBE,ABORTION:THE CLASHOF
ABSOLUTES(1990).
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lify Roe - human life legislation, court-stripping,and constitutional amendment. When the federal governmentdid act, it never
directlycalled into questionthe correctnessof Roe. Restrictionson
abortionfunding,familyplanningservices,and fetal tissue research
do not contradictRoe and its progeny. While these measures express a preferencefor childbirthand make access to abortion services more difficult,none of these antiabortionefforts challengesthe
constitutionalityof the abortionright.
Drawing a line, as the federal governmenthas done, between
judicial authority,which it does not challenge, and abortion access
- which, at least prior to the election of Bill Clinton, it did not
support- is much more than the triumphof form over substance.
That Congressand the White House have channeled their opposition to a judicialpronouncementin ways that do not openly contradict Court decisionmakingis testament to the elected branches'
respect for the judiciaryas a coequal branch of government. Indeed, if anything, Congress and the White House have been extraordinarilysolicitous of the Court'sabortion-relatedaction.
When the elected branchesengage in constitutionalinterpretation, the undisputablebenchmarkof their efforts is SupremeCourt
decisionmaking. Not only are congressionalreports and executive
branch testimony replete with citations to the U.S. Reports, but
neither executive branch officials nor legislators defend constitutional positions at odds with the Supreme Court. When Bush administrationofficials testified against Congress'sefforts to use its
commerce power to codify Roe, for example, they never forthrightly embraced a theory of federalism at odds with Supreme
Court pronouncements;instead, they couched their federalism argument in public policy terms.63Likewise,when the Senate Judiciary Committee considered human life legislation, only
subcommitteechair John East spoke of Congress'sauthorityto interpret independently the Constitution,but his subcommittee report nonetheless emphasizedCourt decisionmaking.64Admittedly,
Court rulings are sufficientlyopen-ended that they present plenty
of fodder for prochoice and prolife forces. In addition,the invocation of Court decisions,ratherthan reflectingactualrespect for the
Court, may be little more than a smoke screen designed to gain
partisanpolitical advantage. The fact remains,however, that both
63. See Freedomof ChoiceAct of 1991:Hearingof the Sen. Comm.on Laborand Human
Resources,102d Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1991) (statementof John Harrison,Deputy Assistant
AttorneyGeneral,Officeof Legal Counsel,U.S. Departmentof Justice)[hereinafterHarrison Testimony].
64. See SUBCOMM. ON SEPARATION OF POWERS OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 97TH CONG., 1ST SESS., THE HUMAN LIFE BILL S. 158: REPORT TOGETHER WITH ADDITIONAL AND MINORITY VIEWS TO THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 20-30 (Comm. Print

1981).
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sides of any given issue perceive that their constitutionalarguments
will be taken seriously only if built around Court doctrine.
State responses to Roe, for the most part, follow a similar pattern. Although forty-eightstates passed abortionlegislation in the
years following Roe, only a handful of states have played a leadership role in enacting stringent abortion laws. Most states wait to
see if the courts will approve these "challenger"state initiatives.65
Furthermore,most challenger state action is not clearly at odds
with Court decisions but tests the limits of these decisions. For example, Roe did not explicitly address parental or spousal consent,
public funding,hospital-onlyabortions,and waitingperiods, among
other things. State action on those subjectsengages the judiciaryin
a dialogue on the sweep of abortion rights;it does not necessarily
challenge Court authority.66
The possibility that elected government output may not measure elected governmentpreferencesalso suggests that one should
not read too much into elected government resistance to Roe.
Many elected officialswere quietly pleased by Roe. John Hart Ely,
for example, speaks of "[t]he sighs of relief as this particularalbatross was cut from the legislative and executive necks."67 That
states enacted an avalancheof abortionrestrictionsmay only mean
that legislators saw no downside in responding to prolife interest
groups,for prochoiceconcernswere content to leave it to the courts
to protect their interests. In a sense, federal and state efforts to
limit abortionrightspaid homage to a judiciarythat would tow the
line and provide whatever constitutional protections were
appropriate.
Roe's transformation of the political marketplace, in other
words, was rooted in the belief that the Supreme Court would vigorously defend abortion rights. By legalizing abortion, Roe eliminated the demand for prochoice legislation while leaving the
demand for prolife legislation unaffected,or perhaps even causing
it to grow. At the same time, Roe also increased the supply of
prolife legislation. Before the decision, the benefit the prochoice
65. See Glen Halva-Neubauer,AbortionPolicyin the Post-WebsterAge, PUBILUs,
Summer 1990,at 27, 32-34.
66. There is an importantcaveat here;state effortsto limit the sweep of abortionrights
present- and are intendedto present- the Courtwith an opportunityto rethinkits position on abortion. As such,these effortsare clearlyantagonisticto Roe. Nevertheless,virtually all state antiabortionefforts - by speakingto mattersnot explicitlyaddressedby the
Court - do not questionthe Court'sauthorityto issue opinionsor renderjudgmentsthat
"have general applicabilityand deserve the greatest respect from all Americans." Edwin
Meese III, The TulaneSpeech: WhatI Meant,WASH.POST,Nov. 13, 1986,at A21, reprinted
in 61 TUL.L. REV.1003 app. at 1004 (1987). See generallySymposium,Perspectiveson the
Authoritativeness
of SupremeCourtDecisions,61 TUL L. REV.977 (1987).
67. JohnHartEly, TheWagesof CryingWolf:A Commenton Roe v. Wade,82 YALEL.J.
920, 947 (1973).
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movement obtainedfrom a legislativevictorywas offset by the loss
the prolife movement sustained, and vice versa. But Roe eliminated many, if not most, negative externalities associated with
prolife laws. By writing abortion rights into the Constitution,the
Courtassuredprochoicersthat they could not lose the benefitsthey
had won. Specifically,because courts likely would invalidate antiabortion measures that ran afoul of Roe's trimester test,
prochoicershad little reason to fightlegislativeefforts to limit abortion access. Consequently, legislators voting on prolife bills no
longer had to worry that their prochoice constituentsmight complain. Instead,they could vote for the bills so that the prolife activists would obtain a legislative benefit, while Roe ensured that
prochoice citizens would not suffer any measurableloss.
Despite the efforts of prolife groupsto pass laws that might give
the SupremeCourt an opportunityto limit Roe, between 1973 and
1989 the Court decided only a single major issue in their favor,
when it permittedstates to refuse to fund poor women's abortions
through Medicaid.68 Websterv. ReproductiveHealth Services69
changed all that. On the brink of overturningRoe, three Justices
unworkableand opened the
declared "the rigid Roe framework"70
door to antiabortionlegislation. Unlike Courtrulingsapprovingrestrictions on federal funding of abortions, Webstersignaled the
Court'sreadinessto limit abortionaccess for all women. By threatening the rights of middle- and upper-classwomen, however, Webster revealed a general contentment among federal and state
legislators with the Roe-created "status quo." Specifically,rather
than promptinga new wave of abortionregulation,legislativeinaction followed in Webster'swake.
The post-Webstercalm reveals that many legislatorswould have
preferredthat the Courtretaincontrolover abortionand not return
the issue to elected government. Grace Duke, a RepublicanOhio
state legislator,spoke of "everyonehoping the courtswould decide
and it wouldn'tgo throughthe legislatures."71WilliamBlack, a RepublicanIllinois state legislator,began to supportabortionrightsin
the aftermathof Webster,"whichhe said had given new weight and
effect to his votes on abortion."72Even in Missouri,Webstercame
as a not-entirely-welcomesurprise to state legislators. "[Ninetyfive] percent who voted for this bill [upheldin Webster]believed it
68. Harrisv. McRae,448 U.S. 297 (1980).
69. 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
70. 492 U.S. at 518 (Rehnquist,C.J.,joined by White & Kennedy,JJ.).
71. Joe Frost, Americans in the Center Focus on Abortion Fight, NEW ORLEANSTIMES
PICAYUNE, Sept. 11, 1991, at A3.

72. WilliamE. Schmidt,OnetimeAbortionFoes Aren'tSo Sure Anymore,N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 4, 1989,at A18.
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didn't have a chance,"73 argued Missouri prochoice activist Mary
Bryant. "They looked at that preamble [specifying that life begins
at conception] and laughed. 'This is stupid. The court will never go
for it.' "74
Webster's transformation of the political marketplace, although
contrary to the predictions of prochoice and prolife interest groups
that an avalanche of antiabortion legislation would follow in the
decision's wake,75 is not surprising. Knowing that prochoice forces
were "going to take names and kick ankles,"76 Webstermade rightto-life initiatives less likely to succeed. The Roe-created "status
quo" became the governing norm, despite the fact that Roe had
earlier invalidated forty-six state laws.77
Planned Parenthood v. Casey78 tells a similar tale. When the
Court agreed to hear Casey in January 1992, abortion rights sup-

porterssaw the "neckof Roe v. Wadesquarelyon the judicialchopping block" and spoke of "[t]he days of safe and legal abortion in
America [as] numbered."79What the Court did, however, was to
embrace a middle-groundapproach - reaffirmingRoe but rejecting its stringenttrimesterstandardin favor of a less-demanding
undue burdenstandard. As was true with Webster,the Court'srecognition of broadstate regulatoryauthorityreinforcedthe post-Roe
status quo. Most state Attorneys General, for example, have resisted enforcing existing state laws with Pennsylvania-typerestrictions.80 Instead, Attorneys General returnedthe issue to the state
legislatures,claimingthat lawmakersneed to reaffirmtheir support
73. CynthiaGorney, TakingAim at Roe v. Wade,WASH.POST,Apr. 9, 1989(Magazine),
at 18.
74. Id.
75. RepresentativeChris Smith (R-N.J.), chair of the CongressionalPro-Life Caucus,
heraldedWebsteras "trulya significantvictoryfor unbornchildren... [that]is likely to lead
to the enactmentof state laws." PressConferenceof the NationalRight to Life Committee,
FederalNews Service,July 3, 1989,availablein LEXIS, Nexis Library,Fednew File. Kate
Michelman,ExecutiveDirectorof the NationalAbortionRightsAction League (NARAL),
went a step further,observing,"Weare now careeningdown the slipperyslope towardsgovernmentalcontrol of our most fundamentalright. Women'slives hang by a thread,and the
Justicesthis morninghandedthe state politiciansa pairof scissors."PressConferenceon the
Websterv. ReproductiveHealthServicesDecision, Kate Michelman,ExecutiveDirector,National Abortion Rights Action League, Federal News Service, July 3, 1989, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library,FednewFile.
76. 135 CONG.REC.18,170(1989) (statementof Rep. Les AuCoin).
77. Websteralso prompteda spate of prochoicelegislativeinitiativesat both the state and
federallevel. Connecticut,Maryland,Nevada,and Washingtonall respondedto the decision
by passing protectivelegislation. At the federallevel, Congresssought to loosen abortion
fundingrestrictions- only to be thwartedby a Bushveto - and took up freedomof choice
& DEVINS,
legislationto codify Roe v. Wade. See FISHER
supranote 57, at 232-44.
78. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
79. LindaP. Campbell,CourtTo Hear KeyAbortionCase,Cm. TRIB.,Jan.22, 1992,? 1,
at 1, 10.
80. Mimi Hall, TheAbortionRuling: Day Two,USA TODAY,July 1, 1992,at 3A.
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for abortion restrictionsby writing a new law. State legislators,
however, seem reluctantto enact antiabortionmeasures. Although
Caseyhas hardlyslowed down the pace of abortion-relatedproposals - roughlythree hundredmeasureswere introducedin each of
the two years following the decision81- state responses to Casey
reenforce the post-Webstertrend of diminishingstate intervention
in abortion. Most striking,accordingto Alan GuttmacherInstitute
studies, "antiabortionlegislators[have]heeded ... [Casey] and curtailed their attemptsto make abortionillegal."82In 1994,for example, no state introduced legislation to outlaw abortion.83
Furthermore,in the two years following Casey,a thirdof legislative
initiatives would have guaranteedthe right to abortion.84Finally,
of the handful of abortion regulation measures adopted since
Casey,most involve restrictionsapprovedby the Court: waitingperiods, informed consent, and parentalnotification.85
Casey'simpact on federal abortionpolitics is also telling. Prior
to the decision - when there was reason to think that the Court
was set to overruleRoe v. Wade- Congressseemed poised to codify abortion rights through freedom of choice legislation. Casey's
qualifiedreaffirmationof Roe killed that effort, despite the fact that
freedom of choice legislation was far more protective of abortion
rights than the Court's newly minted "undue burden"standard.86
For many prochoicelawmakers,there no longer was adequate reason for Congress to bear the decisional costs of taking a hard-line
position on abortion rights. After all, Roe - though crippled was clearly alive. Along the same lines, Congresssaw no reason to
challenge directly the Court's decisionmakingauthority - something it is typicallyreluctantto do in constitutionaldisputes- over
something as amorphousas the appropriatestandardof review in
abortion cases.
Elected governmentperceptionsabout the judicialrole and the
respect owed Supreme Court decisions figures prominentlyin the
story of abortionpolitics. To begin with, ratherthan independently
interpret the Constitution, elected officials frame their constitutional argumentsaroundSupremeCourtdecisions. Farmore signif81. Alan Guttmacher Inst., Legislative Proposals and Actions, ST. REPROD.HEALTH
Alan Guttmacher Inst., LegisMONITOR,
May 1994, at i [hereinafter 1994 HEALTHMONITOR;
lative Proposals and Actions, ST. REPROD.HEALTHMONITOR,Dec. 1993, at i [hereinafter
1993 HEALTHMONITOR].
82. 1993 HEALTHMONITOR,supra note 81, at i.
83. 1994 HEALTHMONITOR,supra note 81, at ii.
84. See 1994 HEALTHMONITOR,supra note 81; 1993 HEALTHMONITOR,supra note 81.

85. See id. State refusalto act on Caseyrefutesthe suggestionthat Roe led to increased
publicoppositionto nontherapeuticabortions. See CharlesH. Franklin& Liane C. Kosaki,
RepublicanSchoolmaster:The U.S. SupremeCourt,Public Opinion,and Abortion,83 AM.

POL. SCI. REV. 751 (1989).
86. See Harrison Testimony, supra note 63.
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icantly, elected government has chosen certain types of limited
responses and rejected more confrontationalapproaches. That is
quite significant,as is the fact that federal and state officials,while
supportingmeasures at odds with abortion rights, may well have
preferred that the Court maintaincontrol over this issue. On this
point, the strikingabsence of elected governmentaction following
the Court's recognition of substantial state regulatory power in
Websterand Casey suggests a seeming contentment with Courtcreated abortion rights. Libertyand Sexuality,while heraldingthe
judicial interventionin Griswoldand Roe, does not fully recognize
the impactof Courtdecisionmaking.The real story of Roe v. Wade,
contrary to Garrow's inference but supportive of his hypothesis,
reveals a surprising sensitivity of elected government to the
judiciary.
B. Social and PoliticalInfluenceson SupremeCourt
Decisionmaking
Just as the courts shape elected government, elected government also shapes the courts. Liberty and Sexuality, by treating
Court decisionmakingas the sine qua non of the abortion dispute,
never considers the pivotal role that social and political influences
play in Court decisionmaking.
Throughout the post-Roe period, the Court validated elected
governmentefforts to limit abortionrights. At the federal level, the
Court approved several legislative and regulatory initiatives and
struck down none. By emphasizingCongress'spower of the purse
and the deference owed to executive branch statutory interpretations, the Supreme Court upheld abortion funding restrictionsin
Harrisv. McRae;87federallysupportedadoption counselingby reliand regulationsforbidgious organizationsin Bowen v. Kendrick;88
ding family planning centers from discussing abortion in Rust v.
Sullivan.89These decisions make clear that the elected branches
play a vital role in the abortion dispute.
1992's Planned Parenthoodv. Casey90is a culminationof these
interchanges between the Court and elected government. After
five abortion-dominatedSupremeCourt confirmationhearingsand
hundredsof thousandsof abortionprotestersmarchingeach year at
its steps, the Court formallyreconsideredand moderatedRoe. By
simultaneouslyreaffirmingabortion rights and gutting Roe's stringent trimestertest, Casey sought to find a middle ground between
two irreconcilablepoles.
87. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
88. 487 U.S. 589 (1988).
89. 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
90. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
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Casey is a remarkabledecision. At one level, the Court seems
beside itself in self-doubt. Acknowledgingthat it can neither appropriatefunds nor commandthe militaryto enforce its orders,the
Court recognizesthat its power lies "in its legitimacy,a product of
substance and perception that shows itself in the people's acceptance of the Judiciary."91In other words,as psychologistsTom Tyler
and Gregory Mitchell observe, the Court seems to believe "that
public acceptanceof the Court'srole as interpreterof the Constitution - that is, the public belief in the Court's institutionallegitimacy - enhances public acceptance of controversial Court
decisions."92This emphasis on public acceptance of the judiciary
seems proof positive that the outcome in Caseycannot be divorced
from the case's explosive social and political setting.93
Casey,however,goes to great lengthsto declarethat "socialand
political pressures,"94far from being relevant, must be resisted.
Otherwise, anarchywill rule the day, for our nation will have forsaken its commitment"to the rule of law."95For this reason, Casey
hinges its reaffirmationof Roe on stare decisis grounds. In other
words,whetheror not the Courtcorrectlydecided Roe is beside the
point; the Court's institutionallegitimacyand, with it, the rule of
law will be shattered if the Court "overrule[s]under fire."96Beyond this rule of law claim, Casey invokes judicial supremacyto
defend its authorityto settle the abortion dispute. Calling on the
"contendingsides of a national controversyto end their national
division,"97Caseyimploresthe publicto rise to the occasionby submitting to the Court.
All of this bringsus to the $64,000question: How independent
is the Court? Casey'smiddle-groundapproach,as well as its emphasis on legitimacyand public acceptance,at face value, supports
91. 112 S. Ct. at 2814.
92. TomR. Tler & GregoryMitchell,Legitimacyand the Empowermentof Discretionary
Legal Authority:The UnitedStatesSupremeCourtand AbortionRights,43 DUKEL.J. 703,
715 (1994).
93. Casey'smiddle-groundapproachto both abortionrightsand broad state regulatory
authority,withoutquestion,matchedpublicopinion. Fifty-sevenpercentof voterssupported
the Pennsylvanialaw. WallStreetJournal/NBCPoll, WALLST.J., May22, 1992,at Al. By a
fifty-nineto twenty-onepercentmargin,however,votersalso said that they were more likely
to supportcandidateswho supportabortionrightsin the 1992elections. WallStreetJournal/
NBC Poll, WALLST.J., Oct. 23, 1992,at Al. More specifically,"manyAmericans... support such restrictionson access to abortionservices as requiringwomen younger than 18
yearsto get a parent'spermission(70%to 73% approve),a 24-hourwaitingperiod (69% to
81%), and requiringmarriedwomen to informtheir husbandsbefore receivingan abortion
(62% to 69%)." Robert J. Blendon et al., The Public and the ControversyOverAbortion,
270 JAMA, 2871, 2873 (1993).
94. 112 S. Ct. at 2814.
95. 112 S. Ct. at 2814.
96. 112 S. Ct. at 2815.
97. 112 S. Ct. at 2815.
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the claim of Robert Dahl, Richard Funston, and others that the
Supreme Court is molded by popular opinion.98 Dahl's landmark
1957 study found that the Court was hardly ever successful "in
blocking a determinedand persistentlawmakingmajorityon a major policy."99Rather, with the appointments-confirmation
process
enabling the elected branches to place on the Court individuals
whose politicalphilosophiescomportwith majoritarianpreferences,
Dahl concludesthat "policyviews dominanton the Courtare never
for long out of line with the policy views dominantamong the lawmaking majorities of the United States."100Funston's 1975 study
buildsupon this theme. Arguingthat only "duringtransitionalperiods, in which the Court is a holdover from the old coalition, [will]
the Court ...

perform the counter-majoritarian functions ascribed

to it by traditionaltheory,"l01 Funston concludes that the Court is
typically a yea-saying branch. "The hypothesis, in other words, is
that, as Mr. Dooley so crypticallyput it, 'the SupremeCourtfollows
the election returns.' "102

There is little doubt that the Court is sensitive to politics. The
abortiondispute,however, standsas a counterexampleto Dahl and
Funston'sbroaderclaimsaboutjudicialcompliancewith lawmaking
majorities. To begin with, the Court has spoken with a
countermajoritarianvoice throughout the abortion controversy.
Roe v. Wadeinvalidatedforty-sixstate laws. From Roe to Webster,
the Court withstood an onslaught of state antiabortionmeasures,
strikingmost of them down and extending its reasoning in Roe.103
Although the Court approved federal and state efforts to limit
abortion throughappropriationsand other indirectrestrictions,the
Court never backed away from its conclusion that a woman has a
constitutionallyprotected right to terminateher pregnancy. Casey,
while severely limiting Roe, nonetheless reaffirmedRoe's "central
98. See BeverlyB. Cook, Public Opinionand FederalJudicialPolicy,21 AM.J. POL.Sci.
567 (1977); Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Makingin a Democracy: The SupremeCourt as a
NationalPolicy-Maker,6 J. PUB.L. 279 (1957);RichardFunston, The SupremeCourtand
Critical Elections, 69 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 795 (1975).

99. Dahl, supranote 98, at 286.
100. Id. at 285.
101. Funston,supranote 98, at 796.
102. Id. For the classicargumentthat the Court'sprincipalfunctionis to providelegiti-

macy to governmental conduct by upholding it as constitutional, see CHARLESL. BLACK,JR.,
THE PEOPLEAND THECOURT(1960).

103. Whilemanyof these antiabortionmeasureswere the triumphof well-organizedand
intenselyinterestedpoliticalminoritiesover a prochoicemajoritythat left it to the courtsto
protect their interests,it is nonethelesstrue that these measureswere enacted throughthe
"majoritarian"
politicalprocess. Consequently,althoughCourtdecisionsstrikingdownthese
abortionrestrictionsmay have matchedpublic opinion, these Court decisions - like any
decision striking down the action of elected majorities were technically
countermajoritarian.
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[countermajoritarian]
holding."104 In so doing, Casey invalidateda
spousal notification provision that has wide public-opinion
support.105

It is nonetheless incorrectto view the abortion dispute as the
triumph of law over politics. The Court has approved a broad
range of indirectrestrictionson abortionrightsand has significantly
moderated its Roe v. Wade holding. Much like elected government's refusalto challengeCourtdecisionmakingauthoritydirectly,
the Courttoo seems respectfulof elected governmentparticipation
in the shapingof constitutionalvalues. Libertyand Sexualityerrs in
not recognizing the interactive nature of constitutional decisionmakingby failingto examinethe ways in which elected government
and the courts have shaped each other. Liberty and Sexualityis
somewhat misleading in depicting the relationship between the
Court and elected governmentin linear adversarialterms. While
that depiction goes a long way in explaining the pre-Roe period,
which is the principalfocus of Garrow'sstudy, the Roe to Casey
period -

which is clearly a part of Garrow's study -

tells a much

differentstory.

III. CONCLUSION

A permanent feature of our constitutional landscape is the
ongoing tug and pull between elected governmentand the courts.
Without question, social and political forces "set[] the boundaries
for judicial activity and influence[] the substance of specific decisions, if not immediatelythen within a few years."'06 The Supreme
Court'srepudiationof the trimesterstandardas well as its approval
of abortion funding restrictionsand Reagan-era regulatoryinitiatives are therefore very much a part of "what Roe really represents."l07 At the same time, by "placingissues on the agenda of
public opinion and of other politicalinstitutions[and] providingan
imprimaturof legitimacyto one side or another,"108Court action
affects majoritarianpreferences. Roe makes clear how influential
Court decisions can be. It served as a benchmarkin constitutional
deliberationsundertakenby elected government. More strikingly,
Websterand Casey'snoneventfulaftermathreveals that Roe shaped
political attitudestoward abortionrights.
David Garrow'sLibertyand SexualitydemonstratesRoe's monumental impact in making abortion rights a reality. Without deci104. PlannedParenthoodv. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2812 (1992).
105. Blendon et al., supranote 93, at 2873.
106. Louis Fisher,Social Influenceson ConstitutionalLaw, 15 J. POL.SCI.7, 8 (1987).
107. A Conversationwith David J. Garrow,supranote 11.
108. JonathanD. Casper,The SupremeCourtand NationalPolicy Making,70 AM.POL.

ScI. REV. 50, 63 (1976).
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sions like Griswoldand Roe, there is little reason to think that the
1960s abortion reform movement would have succeeded. Liberty
and Sexualitydrives this point home. Its thoroughgoinghistory of
pre-Roe politics is an achievementin and of itself - effectively rebutting Robert Bork's suggestionthat Griswoldwas superfluousas
well as the claims of Ruth Bader Ginsburg,Gerald Rosenberg, and
others that Roe did less to help the cause of reproductiveautonomy
than people commonly suppose.
Libertyand Sexuality,happily,offers much more than a refutation of the historical foundations of Griswold's and Roe's critics.
The book also does a superiorjob of detailing the history of the
litigationstrategyof the reproductiveautonomymovement and the
deliberations of the Supreme Court Justices sympathetic to the
cause. While Garrow'sfocus on the prochoice side of the equation
makes his history a bit one-sided, he is meticulousand evenhanded
in telling this side of the story.
Where Libertyand Sexualityfalters is in its failure to consider
the interactive nature of constitutionaldecisionmaking,especially
in the post-Roe era. History makes clear that courts and elected
governmentinfluenceeach other in significantways. Garrow'shistory is too Court-centeredto recognize these influences. Despite
this criticism,Libertyand Sexualityis indispensablereadingfor anyone interested in uncoveringthe story of Roe v. Wade. With Roe's
landmarkstatus assured, Liberty and Sexualitytoo will endure as
the definitiveaccountof the Roe decision and the events leading up
to it.

